A Revolutionary History of
Biliran Province from 1899 to 1909
By Rolando O. Borrinaga
(This paper was serialized in Bankaw News in early 1995. Together with its notes, it was presented
as a paper during the NCCA Echo-Seminar on "The Unfolding of the Revolution in the Leyte-Samar Region" at the Leyte Normal University, Tacloban City, on August 1-2, 1996.)
Introduction
A big blind spot in the local historiography of the Leyte-Samar region belongs to those historical events that occurred in the newly created province of Biliran, which used to be part of Leyte. Appearing like the silhouette of a woman’s head north of mainland Leyte, Biliran is a largely neglected island, both politically and socio-economically. Yet, this place played an important role for the fledgling colony of Spain at the turn of the 17th century. In 1600, Isla de Panamao (now Biliran Island) became the site of the first large-scale Spanish shipyard in the Philippines, presumably because its forests abounded with wood excellent for shipbuilding.1 After a few years, the shipyard was transferred to Cavite, probably out of fear of the on-setting Moro raids, and Biliran became a neglected and obscure island for more than a century.
During the later part of the 18th century, Biliran Island attained notoriety because of its first parish priest, a native appointee of the Spanish colonial government.2 The deluded cura de Biliran styled himself as "St. Peter" with the royal throne in Biliran. He spread his heresies from this island, attracted numerous followers from Leyte and Samar, and instigated violence and hostilities against the Franciscans in Samar and the Augustinians in Leyte, apparently with the tolerance and help of the alcalde mayor (governor) for Leyte and Samar. This priest was captured and killed by Moro raiders after 10 years of his reign around the year 1775.3 After this event, Biliran Island again sank back to obscurity and official neglect.
In this local historical paper, we explore a tumultuous decade in the history of Biliran Province. We begin with the year following the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United States, then proceed to the years of the Philippine-American War and the subsequent "pacification" campaigns, and end with the year of the last major conflict in the island during the early American period.
By "atrocity," we refer to savage brutality, cruelty, and wickedness. By "intemperance," we refer to the lack of moderation in satisfying an appetite or passion. And by "ferment," we refer to an agent that causes agitation, tumult, or intense activity.4 Wherever they appear in the text, the terms pueblo and town refer to a municipality, which is composed of a poblacion and several barrios and sitios, while capitan municipal and municipal president refer to the municipal mayor. We tried as much as possible to retain the relevant terminology in their appropriate contexts, fully aware that these were altered or overlapped in usage during the period under review. The major revolutionary ferments are arranged in chronological order and interwoven and contextualized under the broad historical developments of those years.
MAJOR REVOLUTIONARY FERMENTS
1. Creation of new pueblos during the Philippine-American War
After the signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898, in which Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States for $20-million, US President William McKinley issued his well-known Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation dated December 21, 1898.5 With this proclamation, it became apparent that the Americans would not only refuse the Filipinos’ desire for independence, but would also exercise sovereignty over the Philippines. This annexation move was vehemently protested by the Malolos Government, which promptly issued a manifesto demonstrating to the Americans "that the (Filipino) revolutionists were not insensitive to decisions made by others concerning them and that they were firm and constant in their principle to direct their own destiny."6
With the perception of an imminent and inevitable conflict with the Americans, General Emilio Aguinaldo, the President of the Malolos Republic, "sent several trusted officers to the Visayas with the aim of consolidating the Republic and encouraging local resistance."7 The first appointment for the Leyte-Samar area was that of General Vicente R. Lukban, a Bicolano, who arrived in Catbalogan, Samar, on December 31, 1898, and began acting as military-political governor of the area.8 On January 17, 1899, General Lukban arrived in Tacloban, Leyte, to continue the tasks he had started in Catbalogan.9
When General Lukban was already in the Leyte-Samar area, a Caviteño officer, General Ambrocio Mojica, received from General Aguinaldo on January 1, 1899, his appointment as military-political governor for Leyte, taking half of the territory previously assigned to General Lukban.10 His instructions were "to proceed to Leyte to organize the province, collect taxes, war contributions, and confiscate most Spanish property."11 He arrived in Tacloban on February 7, 1899, three days after the Philippine-American War broke out near Manila in the evening of February 4th.12 General Mojica’s presence started the "Mojica-Lukban issue" on the Leyte leadership after General Lukban showed reluctance in turning over full control of the province to his peer.13
Unknown to most historians by far was that General Mojica did not proceed to Tacloban directly from Luzon. He apparently island-hopped to reach Leyte. His reported arrival place was in the present Barangay Balacson of Kawayan town, which used to be known as Barrio Telegrafo of Almeria pueblo.14 General Mojica and his party were received lavishly by the local residents. To memorialize his arrival, the general either recommended or agreed that the name of the place be changed to San Clemente, after the name of his only son, Clemente. In exchange, Mojica presumably created a pueblo out of the barrio, there being on record a capitan municipal and some officials for this place during the Revolutionary period.15
From San Clemente, General Mojica apparently proceeded south to Almeria, where he organized the pueblo. His companion, Lieutenant (later General) Kapili, a Tagalog officer, organized a company of revolucionarios.16 From Almeria, General Mojica and party apparently proceeded to Naval, where they organized the pueblo and recruited revolucionarios, some of whom traveled to Mindanao to also organize and recruit revolucionarios there.17
General Mojica’s presence apparently catalyzed the creation of four new pueblos in Biliran Province in 1899: San Clemente (Kawayan) and Maripipi, which separated from Almeria; and Culaba and Esperanza (Cabucgayan), which separated from Caibiran. The new pueblos were added to the four existing pueblos of Almeria, Biliran, Caibiran, and Naval.18 Thus, while the number of pueblos in Leyte increased only by 28 percent from 40 pueblos at the end of the Spanish regime19 to 51 pueblos by 1902, when the Americans installed their civil government in Leyte,20 the increase in Biliran Province was 100 percent, from four to eight pueblos!
It can now be told that General Mojica proceeded to Tacloban after he had first accomplished his required tasks in Biliran Province. By the time he arrived in Tacloban, the Philippine-American War had started. It reached Leyte one year later, on February 1, 1900, when American troops attacked Tacloban.21
However, for the people of Biliran Province, the war was not fought here during its official duration in Leyte, i.e., from February 1, 1900, when Tacloban was attacked, until May 18, 1901, when General Mojica surrendered.22 War came to Biliran after the province of Leyte was considered "pacified" and turned over to civil administration, as the model province on how to achieve area pacification in the Philippines.23
2. "Kill-and-burn" in Maripipi
The organized resistance in Leyte was deemed to have ended with the surrender of General Ambrocio Mojica, the military-political governor of Leyte, on May 18, 1901.24 However, on August 3, 1901, General Lukban addressed a proclamation from Samar to the "people of Leyte," announcing that he would take command of Leyte as well as Samar.25 One of his initial acts for Leyte appeared to have been the appointment of Manuel Bacolod as capitan municipal of Maripipi, in lieu of the incumbent, Tarcelo Gaviola.26
First blood was drawn in the island of Maripipi when its Chinese residents, 11 of them, were rounded up by local revolucionarios, placed inside sacks, and thrown to drown in the sea.27 They were probably executed around the time of the famous massacre of US Marines stationed in Balangiga, Samar, on September 29, 1901.28 The "Balangiga massacre" prompted General Jacob Smith, the commanding general of the US Army based in Tacloban, Leyte, to issue his "kill-and-burn" policy on Samar, and to urge the suspension of the status of civil government (which was refused) in Leyte.29
Anyway, the "kill-and-burn" policy was also enforced in Leyte, although unofficially. When the American military authorities learned about the Chinese murders in Maripipi, US Army troops were sent to that island to search for and punish the murderers. The Americans landed on an abandoned town, which they promptly burned — "houses, church, everything ... of the residential houses, 80 percent were razed to the ground."
After the burning, 13 "negligent" municipal officials and prominent citizens were rounded up. They were brought to Catbalogan, Samar, where 11 of them, including Manuel Bacolod, were tortured and executed after a heavy meal by pounding them to death "through the use of big logs which were suspended in a nicely decorated room." The two survivors, Tarcelo Gaviola and Crisanto Rosanto, were reported to have escaped.30 However, they appeared to have been set free after torture. Perhaps, the Americans merely wanted to even up for the murdered Chinese, tit for tat.
About the events in 1901, Joseph Grant, the American civil governor for Leyte from 1902 to 1904, complained in his 1902 report that:
"... (T)he military authorities further aroused the resentment and indignation of the people by the arrest and sending to Samar, without warrant or other process, quite a number of Leyte municipal officials and other prominent citizens, charged with aiding or abetting the Samar insurgents. This action was preceded by the wholesale arrest, in the same manner, of about 150 residents of Tacloban, during the month of October, 1901, who were subsequently released on the protest of the provincial governor ... After their return to Leyte the provincial governor requested that the military commander furnish him with copies of the charges and the evidence upon which these people had been arrested, that he might have complaints filed against them in the civil courts, but he was informed that the character of the evidence was such that it was not considered sufficient upon which to base prosecution. (Italics supplied)
"These and other minor (sic) abuses and indiscretions on the part of the military authorities aided largely in producing a state of demoralization and unrest among the people on the province which afterwards necessitated a large force of constabulary to restore peace and order." 31
3. The Pulahan War of 1902 in Biliran
After a relentless pursuit by the US Army, General Lukban and a small party were finally captured in northern Samar on February 19, 1902. Two months later, on April 21, 1902, the remaining revolucionario officers and several men in Samar, led by Colonel Claro Guevara, surrendered in Catbalogan.32 Samar was subsequently turned over to civilian control effective June 15, 1902. The revolution in both Leyte and Samar was deemed to have ended by then.33
However, the rank and file of the revolution in Samar, some 300 or 400 of them, who were members of the "Dios-dios" sect, a pseudo-religious mass organization, refused to surrender with Colonel Guevara, and sought safety in the island of Biliran. The Leyte governor’s report for 1902 dismissed this group as "malcontents and desperate ladrones and religious fanatics ... from Samar."34 They were otherwise known as the Pulahanes, because of their red uniforms.
Among the first acts of the Pulahanes in Biliran Island was the raid and the burning of the newly-created pueblo of Culaba.35 The raid was probably inflicted to punish the people of Culaba for their virtual pro-American leaning when they accepted Gervacio Abanilla, a Macabebe scout (?), as their municipal president. Abanilla appeared to have been appointed to the position by the American civil governor of Leyte. He was a concurrent Filipino Sub-Inspector of the Insular Constabulary (later Philippine Constabulary). This American-officered militia organization was known to the locals as Insulares, and had a detachment of 15 enlisted men stationed in the Culaba area.36
The Pulahan destruction of Culaba was described as "so great, so complete ... that at the end of the Philippine-American War, Culaba lost its independence and was assigned to Caibiran as its barrio."37
The Pulahanes also raided and burned the barrios of Tucdao and Mapuyo, located along the northwest coast of Culaba poblacion.38 In Barrio Tucdao, the Pulahanes attacked and fatally wounded Captain Joseph Neddo of the Constabulary, the highest-ranking American casualty in Biliran Island. The Pulahanes were officially reported to have incurred 35 deaths during this attack.39
The task of pacifying the island of Biliran of revolucionario elements, and later of the Pulahanes, fell on Colonel Peter Borseth, the Senior Inspector of the Constabulary, who later became the American civil governor of Leyte from 1904 to 1906.40 Colonel Borseth "had almost exclusive direction of the campaign ... where the conditions and obstacles to overcome were peculiarly difficult."41
Absent from the official reports were the procedures applied by Colonel Borseth to pacify Biliran Island. Fortunately, these had been described in the historical data papers of several affected barrios. For instance, in Barrio Tucdao, it had been told that after the encounter that resulted in the fatal wounding of Captain Neddo, the Pulahanes retreated to the mountain, where they were pursued by the Insulares. The reprisal resulted in the deaths of "several hundreds" Pulahanes. The numerous Pulahan casualties were attributed to their lack of firearms.42
Stringent measures were promptly implemented after the above encounter. On orders of Colonel Borseth, the residents of Barrio Tucdao were reconcentrated in their old barrio site, half a kilometer away from the new barrio site and battle area. Sail-boats navigating the sea waters of the barrio were also subjected to security checks. When their sailors could not present safe conduct passes issued by the American authorities, their boats were burned. In neighboring Barrio Mapuyo, which had also been raided and burned by the Pulahanes, the Insulares killed 13 persons (not described as Pulahanes) in two sitios.43
The above-enumerated atrocities were perhaps among the many that prompted journalist Jaime C. de Veyra, who would become the first Filipino governor of Leyte in 1906, to campaign for reforms in the Insular (Philippine) Constabulary between 1904 and 1906.44
The American civil governor of Leyte reported for 1902 that:
"Although Biliran (Island) had suffered more severely, from the effects of (Pulahan) fanaticism and ladronism, than any other part of the province, the end of June (1902) saw the island completely pacified; Inspector Borseth having captured and killed or driven back to Samar the entire band that had sought safety in the rugged mountains of Biliran.
"In the early part of October (1902), however, ten large bancas carrying from 10 to 15 men each, crossed over from Samar and landed more than 100 Dios-dios on the island of Biliran. The people fled, panic-stricken, from their homes, some seeking safety in the towns where there were small detachments of constabulary, while others fled to Leyte towns. The invaders burned, pillaged, robbed, and killed to their hearts’ content, and made a determined attack on the small detachment of constabulary stationed at the town of Naval, hoping to capture their arms, but they were repulsed with considerable loss. The attack was kept for several nights in succession; and although the constabulary had lost several men, in killed or wounded, they held the band off, until Mr. Borseth arrived in the scene with reenforcements. A vigorous campaign was again instituted, in which the towns cooperated heartily, and after about six weeks’ work the island was again cleared of these religious fanatics. This time, however, those that were not killed or captured, instead of returning to Samar, made their way across the island of Leyte ...." 45
The governor’s statistics for the 1902 Pulahan War in Leyte showed that "the constabulary have captured and had surrendered to them 144 rifles, 75 revolvers, 4 shotguns, 1 cannon, and 134 spears, bolos, and other weapons, and have killed 447 ladrones and captured 412."46 A greater portion of these itemized statistics probably belonged to Biliran Island, where the fiercest Constabulary-Pulahan encounters occurred in 1902. Of interest, the number of arms captured or surrendered was much too numerous than the figure "6 to 8" that the district chief of the Constabulary estimated in his report as outside the control of the authorities in Leyte in 1902.47
In his book The Philippine Islands, W. Cameron Forbes, a former governor-general of the Philippines, presented a table on the Constabulary accomplishments over a period of four years until June 1905.48 We present the same table below in modified form, to reflect a comparison with Leyte’s data for 1902.
Table 1. Comparison of Constabulary Accomplishments:
Philippines (July 1901 - June 1905) vs. Leyte (1902)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Philippines Leyte Leyte’s
Four Years) (1902) Percentage
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Ladrones and insurrectos
captured and surrendered 9,155 412 4.5%
Ladrones and insurrectos killed 2,504 447 18.0%
Arms secured 4,288 224 5.2%
Stolen animals recovered 5,805 55 1.0%
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
The brutal experiment in "pacification" with the use of the Constabulary in Biliran Island showed in the official figures. The native deaths in a tiny Visayan island in less than one year still stood at nearly one-fifth (18 percent) of the country’s total over four years.
If there are shameful reasons why accounts of the Constabulary experiments in Biliran are missing in official histories of that organization, the above statistics must be among them. Note that the number of those killed (447) exceeded the number of those who were captured (412).
4. The consolidation of Leyte municipalities
In his report on "municipal governments" prior to June 30, 1902, the American civil governor of Leyte noted:
"Forty-seven out of 51 towns in the province have been organized and in operation, in accordance with the provisions of the municipal code, for more than a year, and have as a whole been administered very satisfactorily. Prior to June 30, it had been impossible to organize the (four) others on account of the disturbed condition of affairs in their vicinity." 49
The cited "unorganized" towns perhaps referred to four "disturbed" towns in Biliran Island. For these towns, the American civil governor made temporary appointments, which he claimed to "have proven very satisfactory."50
In the section on "roads and bridges" of the same report, however, there was a portent of things to come, a reactionary development to the rushed creation of pueblos discussed earlier. The American civil governor noted:
"... (The) lack of interest or willingness on the part of the municipal authorities to make these improvements (of roads and bridges) ... is principally the result of a lack of means with which to make them ... Another reason is that the municipal council in almost every town in the province has voted to the officials the maximum salaries prescribed in the municipal code. The only remedy which suggests itself to my mind is the reduction of the number of municipalities (italics supplied) and the enactment of a law prescribing a special road tax ...." 51
By August 1904, the consolidation of municipalities had reduced the number of Leyte towns from 51 to 34. In Biliran Province, the number of towns had been reduced from eight to three, with Naval, Almeria, and Caibiran remaining. Biliran town was reduced to a barrio of Naval.52
5. A religious controversy in Almeria and the poblacion transfer to Kawayan
In August 1906, Jaime C. de Veyra, the recently elected first Filipino governor of Leyte, reported in a section on "municipal administration" that:
"... (I)n Almeria the trouble arose over the question of Aglipayanism, the situation being difficult one, but fortunately conditions have changed and the excitement has been calmed ...." 53
However, behind this sedate report was a historical religious resentment, complicated by undue official interference that violated the principle of separation of Church and State, which the Americans had vowed to absolutely uphold.
The following is the folk version of the event:54
Since its creation as a separate pueblo in 1886, Almeria had not been assigned a parish priest, despite repeated requests. Because of this, the people felt neglected by the Roman Catholic Church. Finally fed up by the Church’s negligence, the municipal president, Margarito Sabornido, and some of his councilors, "offered" the town to the Philippine Independent (Aglipayan) Church around 1905. The offer was accepted, and an Aglipayan priest,
Fernando Buyser, started to hold religious services in the Catholic Church and occupied its convent. This incident created an uproar among the Catholic faithful, who promptly reported the case to the Roman Catholic authorities in Cebu and the provincial government in Tacloban.
Acting on the official complaints in 1905, Colonel Peter Borseth, who had become the American civil governor of Leyte, suspended the municipal president and three of his six councilors "for three months." Then he reorganized the municipal government by installing an American former soldier, Matthew MacFarland, as acting municipal president. He also appointed new councilors and officials to replace the suspended ones. The three-month suspension turned out to be permanent.
The governor’s high-handed act was resented by most local residents, who sympathized with their beleaguered officials. This resulted in a mass exodus of the local residents to the Aglipayan faith. Unable to withstand the agitation by the numerous Aglipayan converts, the diminished but influential Catholics prevailed upon the MacFarland administration to transfer the seat of the municipality to Barrio Kawayan, 10 kilometers north of the Almeria poblacion. The transfer of the poblacion, including the names of key streets, reduced Almeria to a barrio of the town now named Kawayan....
The poblacion transfer seemed inevitable. Presumably upon the prompting of Colonel Borseth in 1905, the provincial board of Leyte insisted on the convenience of consolidating Maripipi (despite its own repeated petitions to exist as a separate town) and Almeria, with the seat of the municipal government in the barrio of Kawayan.55 This was effected in 1907. Fates were thus sealed at higher official levels, irrespective of the will of the people of Almeria.
6. The "civil war" between Naval and Biliran
Practice makes perfect. After the Almeria-Kawayan controversy was settled in favor of Kawayan, the provincial board of Leyte perhaps entertained next the convenience of consolidating the towns of Naval and Biliran, with the seat of municipal government in the reduced but friendly barrio of Biliran. We do not have access to the official records of the case. Indeed, this case may have disappeared from memory had not two graduating seminary students timely conducted separate interviews in 1957 for their thesis requirements on the local histories of both towns. They documented the case for posterity.56
The official decision to make Biliran the poblacion of the consolidated towns of Naval and Biliran was probably handed down in 1908. In response, the people of Naval, certain of the loss of their town status as what happened to neighboring Almeria, and remembering a historical wrong inflicted on them by the people of Biliran, Naval’s daughter-barrio turned mother-pueblo,57 became agitated and plotted against Biliran town.58
The opportunity for action came in the evening of Biliran’s municipal election in 1909. Armed fighters from Naval successfully entered and attacked Biliran town, grabbed back the seat of municipal government, and returned to install this in Naval. During the attack, the newly-elected municipal president of Biliran town fled to Dulag town in eastern Leyte. Thereafter, the people of Naval were branded as insurrectos by the loser town, "because they revolted against the valid civil government that had been installed in Biliran."59
As a result of the "civil war" between both towns, Biliran was again reduced into a barrio of Naval. Subsequently, the concerned officials of Biliran sent several resolutions to the national government in Manila, pleading to settle the dispute in their favor. Instead, Biliran was granted a separate town status by fiat in 1912.60
Reflections on Biliran history from 1899 to 1909
From the events in Biliran Province during 1899 to 1909, it can be inferred that after the Philippine-American War broke out on February 4, 1899, and while the war was raging in Luzon, certain factions of the local elite (the principalia) had secured for themselves the formal leaderships of the pueblos under General Aguinaldo’s Revolutionary Government. Not only that, other elite factions had taken advantage of the confusion by creating new pueblos, apparently with the full knowledge and facilitation of General Mojica, the military-political governor of Leyte.
The creation of new pueblos may have been allowed by General Mojica, perhaps in exchange for the taxes and war contributions that their proponents promised or committed to the Revolutionary Government. However, General Mojica seemed partly at fault. By either insisting or agreeing to create the new pueblo of San Clemente based at Barrio Telegrafo, he showed a corrupt facet of his personality which, afterwards, was presumably exploited by contending parties for leadership in other pueblos of Leyte. The fact that the elite in Leyte preferred General Mojica to General Lukban, the militant but popular military-political governor of Samar, also betrayed their similarly passive, legalistic, and segurista attitude (as General Mojica’s) towards the Philippine-American War and its eventual outcome.61
The elite in Leyte held on to their formalized leaderships, despite the changing fortunes of the war. After the war formally ended with the surrender of General Mojica, the official pueblo leaders merely shifted their allegiance to the American (military, later civil) government. It was this same social class that pressured the revolutionary rank and file to give up the struggle, even to the extent of assuring the American authorities that they would facilitate the task themselves.62
Regarding the atrocities in Maripipi, only the town’s brief historical data paper recorded the events for posterity, presumably because its prominent citizens were involved.63 These events could not have been included in any American official report, as the US Army hardly kept records of their executions.
Accounts of the fierce Pulahan War in Biliran Island are unfortunately missing in the historical data paper of Kawayan town (notarized at that!), whose barrios were most devastated. Perhaps this was because the Kawayan elite pandered to the Americans and were least affected by the war.64 Moreover, Barrio Tucdao, one of the most devastated villages, was considered part of Culaba by 1902. But then, the official history of Culaba merely mentioned the destruction of its poblacion, and not that of its prominent barrio.65 The same pattern of omission and scanty references is true for the official histories of other towns of Biliran Province. Fortunately, we were able to locate other sources that filled the information gaps for those events that were dramatized by the faceless masses involved in the Pulahan War in Biliran Island.66
The consolidation of the various Leyte municipalities by the American civil government was required, and became a reality by 1904, to curb official (read: elite) excesses and gullibility in many pueblos, and to make the pueblos financially viable and responsive to public infrastructure needs. Regrettably, to this day, we still have to learn the lesson from this official action.
The case of Almeria became sensational because it involved both a heated religious controversy and an effected poblacion transfer, which reduced the official poblacion to a mere barrio by virtue of an American governor’s strong-arm tactics.
In the case of the Naval-Biliran "civil war," it was a revival of a festering historical conflict between both towns. Fortunately in Naval town, its social classes are not that dichotomized. The local elite and the masses could easily coalesce in times of crisis, like when they effectively defended their settlement against several waves of Moro raiders. Unfortunately in Biliran town, the local elite and the masses are dichotomized by its hacienda culture, such that one class could not be expected to come to the rescue of the other by reflex. Thus, when armed fighters from Naval successfully attacked Biliran in 1909, the principalia class in the latter town seemed alone in dealing with the attackers.
In conclusion, the period from 1899 to 1909 in Biliran Province was characterized by scantily recorded and remembered atrocities and intemperances, both by the Americans and the Filipinos. After a splurge of pueblo creation by contesting elite factions, the number of towns in the province was reduced to even less than the number at the close of the Spanish regime (from four, to eight, to three!). The Pulahan War obviously contributed to the misery and poverty of the population, as indicated by the drastic reduction in the number of towns.
As for the Americans before 1909, their record in Biliran Province was a brutal case study on how to educate the Filipinos in self-government. Directly, or indirectly through their Filipino surrogates, the Americans had sown more destruction, discord, and enmity among the people than they had undertaken positive accomplishments. About the only reported accomplishment attributed to them was the opening of the public schools in the three remaining towns of the island. Almost nothing else. Yet, this positive accomplishment was actually not new. There were already schools in the different pueblos of the island before the Americans came, with municipal teachers hired and paid by the pueblo governments.67 These schools were merely closed because of the outbreak of the Philippine-American War.
REFERENCE NOTES
1 Fr. Pedro Chirino. Relacion de las Islas Filipinas (The Philippines in 1600. Rome, 1604. Translated by Ramon Echevarria). Manila: Historical Conservation Society Publication No. 15, 1969. pp. 459-462.
2 Fr. Cantius J. Kobak, OFM, "Don Gaspar de Guevara of Biliran Island, Leyte: A Legendary Figure or a Historical Reality?" Leyte-Samar Studies (Vol. 13, No. 2, 1979), pp. 150-153.
3 Bruce Cruikshank. Samar: 1768-1898. Manila: Historical Conservation Society Publication No. 41, 1985. Chapters 1 and 8.
4 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 1974.
5 Maximo M. Kalaw. The Development of Philippine Politics (1872-1920). Manila: Oriental Commercial Co., 1926. p. 168.
6 Cesar Adib Majul. Apolinario Mabini, Revolutionary. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1970. p. 119.
7 Donald Chaput, "Leyte Leadership in the Revolution: The Moxica-Lukban Issue," Leyte-Samar Studies (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1975), pp. 3-12.
8 Ibid.
9 Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. Leyte: The Historic Islands. Tacloban City: Your Press, 1964. See p. 173 for General Mojica’s arrival date in Tacloban, which differs from the one provided by Donald Chaput (see Note No. 7).
10 See Note No. 7, p. 4.
11 Ibid.
12 See Note No. 9.
13 See Note No. 7.
14 Historical Data Paper of Kawayan, in Historical Data Papers - Leyte (Vol. V). A set of extant Historical Data Papers for Leyte and Samar is found in the collections of the Leyte-Samar Library and Museum, Divine Word University of Tacloban.
15 Ibid.
16 Historical Data Paper of Almeria, in Historical Data Papers - Leyte (Vol. II). See Note No. 14.
17 Interview with Mrs. Gregoria O. Borrinaga on February 3, 1990. My maternal great grandfather, Sotero Orbeta, was a revolucionario who travelled to Mindanao and helped organize the resistance in that island. He was a tenant of the Enage family in Barrio Villalon of Calubian town (then part of Leyte, Leyte).
18 Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. Leyte Towns: Histories/Legends. Tacloban City: Your Press, 1980.
19 See Note No. 9, p. 193.
20 "Report of the Provincial Governor of Leyte," Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903 (Part I). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904. p. 841.
21 See Note No. 9, p. 174.
22 Ibid., p. 184.
23 See Note No. 20, pp. 839-840. On Leyte as "model province," see Reynaldo H. Imperial, Samar (1898-1902): The Revolutionary Career of General Vicente R. Lukban (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of the Philippines, 1983), p. 238.
24 See Note No. 9, p. 184.
25 See Note No. 7, p. 9.
26 Historical Data Paper of Maripipi, in Historical Data Papers - Leyte (Vol. VI). See Note No. 14.
27 Ibid.
28 Kenneth Ray Young, "Guerrilla Warfare: Balangiga Revisited," Leyte-Samar Studies (Vol. 11, No. 1, 1977), pp. 21-31.
29 Kenneth Ray Young, "Atrocities and War Crimes: The Cases of Major Waller and General Smith," Leyte-Samar Studies (Vol. 12, No. 1, 1978), pp. 64-77.
30 See Note No. 26.
31 See Note No. 20, pp. 838-839. Included among those arrested was the municipal president of Biliran town. The provincial governor of Leyte in late 1901 was General Henry T. Allen, the first (of three) American civil governors of Leyte and, later, the first chief of the Insular (Philippine) Constabulary.
32 Eugenio S. Daza, "Some Documents of the Philippine-American War in Samar," Leyte-Samar Studies (Vol. 17, No. 2, 1983), pp. 165-187.
33 "Report of the Chief of the Constabulary Third District," Third Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1902 (Part I). Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, Washington: Government Printing Press, 1903. pp. 215-218.
34 See Note No. 20, p. 839.
35 "History of Culaba," copied from a Town Fiesta Program.
36 See Note No. 33, p. 216. The Constabulary detachment was actually listed as stationed in Caibiran, but this may have been in the Culaba area as claimed in Culaba’s local history.
37 See Note No. 35.
38 See Note No. 14, Historical Data Paper for Barrio Tucdao and Barrio Mapuyo.
39 See Note No. 20, p. 839. Actually, Captain Neddo did not die immediately during the Pulahan attack. He died of blood loss from his fatal wounds on a boat sailing to Carigara. See also Note No. 14, the Historical Data Paper of Barrio Tucdao.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 See Note No. 38, Historical Data Paper of Barrio Tucdao. The "several hundreds" killed Pulahanes appeared in the sentence on the "killing" of the American Constabulary captain (Neddo). Was the rough folk estimate the total Pulahan casualties during the encounter alone, or did this include the casualties during the subsequent reprisal and pacification operations? Please see texts for Notes No. 46 and 47 for the official figures.
43 See Note No. 38, Historical Data Paper for Barrio Mapuyo.
44 M. M. Norton, "Jaime C. de Veyra," Leyte-Samar Studies (Vol. 7, No. 2, 1973), pp. 40-44. See page 42 for the specific citation.
45 See Note No. 20, p. 840. The Constabulary detachment in Naval was composed of 15 enlisted men in 1902, while the detachments in Biliran and Caibiran also had 15 men each. These were among the 247 enlisted men and 6 inspectors assigned to Leyte (see Note No. 33, p. 216).
As of June 15, 1904, only the detachment in Naval remained in Biliran Island, with a force of 31 men. This figure was among the 192 enlisted men and 7 officers assigned to Leyte. Please refer to the "Report of the Governor of the Province of Leyte," Fifth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904 (Part I). Washington: Government Printing Press, 1905. pp. 56-57.
46 See Note No. 20, p. 839.
47 See Note No. 33, p. 216.
48 W. Cameron Forbes. The Philippine Islands. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945. p. 106. Forbes mentioned that, during the same four-year period covered by the report, the Constabulary lost in killed and wounded 22 officers and 295 men.
49 See Note No. 20, p. 841.
50 Ibid. See also Notes No. 18 and No. 35. The towns of Naval and Culaba had municipal presidents appointed by the American authorities. The municipal president of Biliran town, who was nabbed and brought to Catbalogan, was presumably replaced with an American appointee. The capitan municipal of Maripipi, who was executed in Catbalogan, was presumably replaced with an appointee.
51 See Note No. 20, p. 841.
52 "Report of the Governor of the Province of Leyte," Fifth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904 (Part I). Washington: Government Printing Press, 1905. p. 535.
53 "Report of the Governor of the Province of Leyte," Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1906 (Part I). Washington: Government Printing Press, 1905. p. 327.
54 See Note No. 16. Almeria was assigned a resident Catholic parish priest only in the 1980s.
55 See Note No. 53, p. 328.
56 Menardo L. Lumapak, "A Historical Research on Biliran," and Eduardo A. Chico, "A Short History of Naval." These are under-graduate thesis papers submitted in 1957 to the Sacred Heart Seminary in Palo, Leyte. The manuscripts are found in the Leyte-Samar Library and Museum, Divine Word University of Tacloban.
57 Rolando O. Borrinaga, et. al. "Beginnings of Naval, Biliran Island: A Revisionist Account," Kinaadman (Vol. 14, No. 2, 1992), pp. 129-140.
58 See Note No. 56.
59 Ibid.
60 See Note No. 18, p. 126.
61 See Note No. 7.
62 See Note No. 20, p. 840. Governor Grant claimed in 1902 that "... Future disturbances of any magnitude in Leyte need not be apprehended, as the more intelligent class of people (sic) will readily lend their influence and assistance against any attempt at violence, while the great mass of the people are contented and satisfied."
See also Note No. 51, p. 535. It seemed that the elite in Leyte fell short of their promise. The Pulahan War in the province raged afterwards. In 1904, Governor Borseth had to engage in verbal gymnastics to downplay the fact that few people supported the American-installed civil government. He claimed that "...The majority of the leading classes (i.e., the elite) in the greater portion of the municipalities are strongly with the government, and fully appreciate the peace and prosperity that has been given them by the home Government, and so desire no change." This was a roundabout way of saying that the Americans did not gain mass support after four years of their occupation of Leyte. The "leading classes" comprised less than 10 percent of the population.
63 See Note No. 26.
64 See Note No. 14.
65 See Note No. 38.
66 According to Mr. Silvino Barotol, an old fisherman interviewed on Feb. 3, 1990, it was "dangerous" for an adult male from Barrio Caraycaray, Naval to be associated as a relative of a Pulahan. He had to flee beyond the reach of the Insulares.
The Spanish-era watchtower located three kilometers southeast of Naval poblacion was initially occupied by the Pulahanes. This was forcibly taken from them and occupied by the Insulares. A banderahan (flag staff) of the Americans was erected near the beach not far from the watchtower. (Was this also used to signal for troop reinforcements?)
According to a fellow writer, the late Alberto M. Bago, many people from Naval "fled to the mountains when the Insulares arrived in town" (presumably in 1902). Around 1905, the municipal president, Melecio Caneja, enticed the refugees living in the mountains with a home-lot as incentive for them to resettle in the poblacion.
The above information contradicts the official reports (see Note No. 20). It seemed that the people’s hostility towards the Americans and the Insulares was the political reason for transferring the poblacion of Almeria to Kawayan, and of Naval to Biliran. See Note No. 45 for the reinforced Constabulary detachment in Naval by 1904.
67 The pueblo of Almeria already had four municipal teachers before the Americans came. Maripipi had two.
SOURCE:
Borrinaga, Rolando O. (1996, August). Atrocities and Intemperances. Oocities.org. Retrieved from http://www.oocities.org/rolborr/atrocities.html
